=5-7*? 


RUSSIAN  FORE: 


IN  THE  EAST 


MILIVOY  s.  STAND YEVICH,     •  < 

i  ('      ,     /  •    .;  ,        •    • '      :  '  id  \ 


OAKLAND  ANJ)  SAX  ;    :  ^NCTSCO 
LIBERTY  Pt  IVLISUING  COMPANY 


RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

IN  THE  EAST 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR. 


Omladina  u  Sadashnyosti. 
Veshtina  Pisanya. 

Govorne  Figure  u  Pesmama. 

(A   prize   essay). 

Prevodi  u  Srpskim  Zabavnicima. 
(A  prize  essay). 

Tolstoy's  Theory  of  Social  Reform. 

(A  Master's  thesis). 

Russian  Foreign  Policy  in  the  East. 


RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY 

IN  THE  EAST 


BY 


MILIVOY  S.  STANOYEVICH,    ML. 

(University  of  California) 


OAKLAND  AND  SAN  FRANCISCO 

LIBERTY  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

1916 


,  1916 

BY  LIBERTY  PUBLISHING  CO. 
OAKLAND,  CAL. 


PREFACE. 


Whoever  has  carefully  considered  the  past  and  present 
of  historical  phenomena  might  certainly  judge  and  conclude 
of  the  future  political  issues.  To  comprehend  general  Euro- 
pean politics,  one  should  study  the  history  of  Eastern 
Europe,  to  wit,  the  history  of  Russia;  and  to  undestand 
the  Russian  European  history  one  must  be  intimate  with 
Russian  diplomatic  activities  in  Asia,  particularly  in  Far 
Asia.  The  aim  of  this  condensed  essay  is  to  sketch  Russian 
foreign  policy  in  the  East,  from  about  the  begining  of  the 
nineteenth  century  to  the  present  time.  The  student  of 
political  questions  who  wish  to  grasp  in  extenso  Russian  and 
European  politics,  which,  in  recent  tragic  days  is  written, 
not  by  pen  but  by  blood  of  our  brothers  and  fathers,  can 
not  find  sufficient  data  for  his  perusal  in  the  following  pa- 
ges. If  such  a  student  want  to  be  informed  of  Russian 
internal  and  external  policy  from  original  sources  and 
books  more  detailed  and  authoritative,  he  is  advised  to 
consult  the  documents  and  general  works  which  are  listed 
in  the  bibliography  at  the  end  of  this  monograph. 

I  desire  to  acknowledge  the  invaluable  aid  for  facts  and 
ideas  received  from  the  writings  of  M.  N.  Pokrovskago. 
His  illuminating  book,  Russkaya  Istoriya  s  Drevnieyshih 
Vremen  (Russian  History  from  the  oldest  Times),  and  his 
brilliant  articles  in  Istoriya  Rossiyi  v  XI  X  Viekie  (Histo- 
ry of  Russia  in  the  Nineteenth  Century),  offer  mines  of  infor- 
mation, as  well  as  a  sympathetic  interpretation  of  con- 
structive Russian  politics.  More  particular  gratitude  has 
been  richly  merited  by  Dr.  D.  P.  Barrows,  Professor  of 
Political  Science  in  the  University  of  California,  and 

333456 


VI  PREFACE 

Dr.  Payson  J.  Treat,  Professor  of  History  in  Stanford  Uni- 
versity, for  their  acute  observations  and  suggestions  offered 
to  me.  Acknowledgments  and  sincere  thanks  are  also  due 
to  Mr.  Lewis  Anderson,  B.A.,  Miss  Margaret  Hodgen,  B.L., 
and  Dr.  Frank  F.  Nalder,  of  the  University  of  California, 
for  their  kind  assistance  efficiently  rendered  in  the  reading 
and  revising  of  proof. 

M.  S.  S. 

Berkeley,    California. 
February  14,  1916. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 
Russia  in  the  Near  East. 

Three  phases  of  Russia's  expansion  in  the  East  —  Decadence  of  Tur- 
key —  Tsarigrad  [Constantinople]  the  metropolis  of  the  Orthodox 
Church  —  Russian  policy  in  the  Near  East  from  1806  to  1812 — The 
Alliance  between  Russia,  France,  and  Great  Britain  for  liberation 
of  Greece  under  the  Turkish  domination,  1827  —  The  Crimean 
War  —  The  Epoch  of  the  Great  Reforms  —  The  Russo-Turkish  War 
of  1877  —  Occupation  of  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  by  Austria  —  An- 
nexation of  these  two  provinces  —  Rivalry  between  Slavonic  and 
Germanic  powers  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula  —  The  Balkan  Alliance 
of  1912  —  Serbia,  Greece,  Bulgaria,  and  Montenegro  declare  war  on 
Turkey— The  second  Balkan  War — The  Treaty  of  Bucharest  of  1913 
Russia's  failure  in  the  Balkans  —  Her  gain  in  Asia. pp.  1-9. 

CHAPTER  II 
Russia  in  the  Middle  East. 

Expansion  of  Russia  toward  the  Arabian  Sea  —  Annexation  of  Khiva, 
Bokhara  and  Caucasus  —  Russia's  influence  in  Persia  and  Afghanistan — 
Collision  with  Great  Britain  in  the  Middle  East  —  Germany's  Drang 
nach  Osten  —  The  Bagdad  Railroad  —  Russian  and  British  spheres 
of  interest  in  Persia  —  Entente  cordiole  between  the  two  powers  in 
Afghanistan  — Criticism  of  the  Anglo-Russian  agreement  in  the  Middle 
Orient  —  Renunciation  of  Russia  from  the  Persian  Gulf  —  Russia  and 
England  prior  to  the  Convention  of  1907  —  Their  policy  after  the 
Convention  of  1907  —  Persia  and  Afghanistan  at  the  beginning  of  the 
European  War  of  1914  —  Their  neutrality.  _ pp.  10-16. 

CHAPTER  III 
Russia  in  the  Far  East. 

Relation  of  Russia  to  the  Far  East  —  Muraviev-Amurski,  governor 
of  Eastern  Siberia,  1847  —  Annexation  of  the  Amur  and  Maritime 
Province  —  Russian  steamships  in  communication  with  Japan  and 
U.  S.  of  America  —  Russian  trade  in  Mongolia  and  Chinese  Turkestan — 
Formation  of  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank  —  Concessions  in  Manchuria 
—  Russian  policy  and  the  Boxer  rising  in  China  —  The  Tsar  protects 
"the  Son  of  Heaven"  —  A  secret  agreement  between  Russia  and 


VIII  CONTENTS 

China  —  Japan  and  Russia  in  Manchuria  —  Russia  and  Japan    in 
Korea  —  War  between  Russia  and  Japan. pp.  17-22. 

CHAPTER  IV 
Russian  Policy  after  the  Japanese  War. 

A  parallel  between  the  Japanese  and  Russians  in  fight  —  Why  did 
Japan  succed?  —  The  treaty  of  peace — Did  Russia's  policy  fail  in  the 
Far  East?  —  General  characteristic  of  her  foreign  politics  —  Relation 
with  Mongolia  in  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  —  Russia  the 
protector  of  the  Mongolian  peoples  —  Her  protection  of  the  Slavonic 
peoples  —  Turning  from  the  Far  to  the  Near  East  —  Liberation  of  the 
subjugated  peoples  from  the  Turkish  yoke  —  Why  is  Russia  in  war 
with  the  Huns  and  Teutons?  pp.  22-27. 

APPENDIX 
Bibliography _ pp.  29-38. 


RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  IN 
THE  EAST. 

CHAPTER  I 
RUSSIA  IN  THE  NEAR  EAST. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  up  to  the 
present  time,  the  foreign  policy  of  Russia  in  the  East  has 
passed  through  three  important  stages.  These  three  stages 
or  phases  of  expansion  may  be  focused  respectively  on 
the  Aegean  Sea,  the  Arabian  Sea,  and  the  Yellow  Sea,  or  in 
other  words,  on  the  Near  East,  the  Middle  East,  and  the  Far 
East.  To  secure  the  first  outlet,  Russian  diplomats  knew 
that  the  route  lay  through  Constantinople  and  the  Darda- 
nelles; to  attain  the  second  outlet,  the  way  lead  through 
Persia  and  Afghanistan;  and  to  reach  the  third  point,  the 
route  passed  through  Mongolia  and  Manchuria.  The 
southward  expansion  toward  the  Mediterranean  had 
sometimes  a  religious  and  idealistic  aspect.  Transcaucasian 
expansion  had  a  commercial  significance,  and  the  eastward 
expansion  a  political  aspect.  Let  us  first  consider  the  Russian 
foreign  policy  in  the  Near  East. 


Since  Russian  expansion  towards'the  north  was  made 
impossible  by  the  icy  solitudes  of  Lapland,  and  westward 
by  the  frontiers  of  firmly  established  states  such  as  the 
German  and  Austrian  Empires,  the  only  way  open  to  Russia 
was  in  the  direction  of  the  south.  The  decadence  of  Turkey 
seemed  to  offer  her  a  splendid  opportunity  for  such  purposes. 


2  RUSSIAN   FOREIGN  POLICY   IN  THE  EAST 

Diplomats  from|the  Neva  dreamed  of  the  Black  Sea,  Marmo- 
ra Sea,  and  Aegean  Sea,  becoming  Russian  lakes.  And  since 
Russia  as  the  chief  political  representative  of  the  Greek 
Church  feels  that  there  exists  an  historic  connection  bet- 
ween her  and  the  former  Eastern  Roman  Empire,  she  has 
always  coveted  the  restoration  of  Constantinople  as  the 
metropolis  of  the  Eastern  Orthodox  Church,  and  as  the 
capital  of  her  great  empire.  She  longed  for  centuries  to  free 
that  city,  Tsarigrad  (Tsar's  City)  from  the  yoke  of  the 
infidel,  and  to  replace  the  crescent  by  the  cross  on  the 
dome  of  St.  Sophia.  But,  as  the  facts  show,  it  was  in  this 
direction  that  her  diplomacy,  after  some  brilliant  successes, 
found  itself  most  completely  deceived. 

During  the  Russo-Turkish  War  in  1804  under  Tsar 
Alexander  I,  Russian  armies  were  victorious,  and  after  the 
war  they  occupied  the  Turkish  Danubian  principalities  .of 
Moldavia,  Wallachia,  and  Bulgaria.  Occupation  of  these 
provinces  lasted  from  1806  to  1812.  The  rupture  with 
Napoleon  compelled  the  Tsar  to  sign  the  Peace  of  Bucharest 
by  which  of  all  his  conquests  he  retained  only  a  bit  of 
Rumanian  territory,  Bessarabia,  and  two  Danubian  towns, 
Ismail  and  Kilia  on  the  mouths  of  the  Danube.  The  Ru- 
manians and  Bulgarians  fell  again  under  the  Turkish  yoke, 
and  Serbia,  which  won  her  independence  with  her  own  forces 
(1804—1812),  was  left  to  herself.  Such  a  state  of  affairs  in 
the  Near  East  remained  throughout  the  Napoleonic  wars 
in  Europe.  (St.  Stanoyevich,  Istoriya  Srpskoga  Naroda.) 

The  second  intervention  of  Russia  in  the  Near  East  oecur- 
ed  on  the  occasion  of  the  Greek  Revolution.  In  July  1827, 
Russia,  France,  and  Great  Britain,  entered  into  concerted 
action  by  the  Treaty  of  London.  The  united  fleets  of  the 
three  powers  totally  annihilated  the  Turkish  and  Egyp- 
tian fleets  October  20,  1827,  at  Navarino,  under  Admiral 
Codrington.  This  decisive  naval  battle  precipitated  the 
Russo-Turkish  War  of  1828—1829,  and  weakened  the 
resistance  of  Turkey  against  Russia.  At  that  time  the 


RUSSIA    IN    THE    NEAR    EAST  3 

French  army  continued  to  operate  in  the  Morea  to  insure 
Greek  independence,  while  the  Russian  Tsar  Nicholas  I 
took  it  upon  himself  to  settle  the  rest  of  the  Near  Eastern 
Question.  His  European  army  again  conquered  the  Danu- 
bian  principalities,  invaded  Thrace,  and  entered  Adrianople. 
In  Asia  his  forces  occupied  Turkish  Caucasia.  By  the 
Treaty  of  Adrianople,  concluded  in  1829,  the  autonomy 
of  Rumania,  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  Greece,  was  guaranteed, 
but  Russia  did  not  secure  any  territory  in  Europe,  except 
the  isles  of  the  Danubian  delta.  She  also  reserved  for 
herself  freedom  of  navigation  in  the  Black  Sea,  and  an  open 
way  through  the  straits  of  the  Bosporus  and  Dardanelles. 
In  Asia  she  secured  a  real  territorial  compensation  by  the 
acquisition  of  the  northern  part  of  Caucasia. 

The  result  of  the  Peace  of  Adrianople  was  to  make  Russia 
supreme  at  Constantinople.  Later,  in  1833,  a  new  treaty 
was  concluded  between  the  £ultan  and  the  Tsar,  the  Treaty 
of  Unkiar-Iskelessi,  which  constituted  a  defensive  and 
offensive  alliance  between  the  two  powers,  and  established 
virtually  a  Russian  protectorate  over  Turkey.  Friendly 
relations  between  the  two  emperors  lasted  until  1852.  In 
this  year  Russian  prestige  at  the  Porte  began  to  decrease 
and  the  influence  of  England,  France,  and  Austria  to 
increase.  Nicholas  I  sent  his  minister,  Alexander  Sergievich 
Menshikov,  on  a  special  mission  to  Constantinople,  to 
obtain  reparation  in  the  form  of  a  treaty  which  should 
guarantee  the  rights  of  the  Orthodox  Church  in  Palestine, 
and  confirm  the  protectorate  of  Russia  over  all  Ottoman 
Christians,  established  by  the  treaties  of  Bucharest  and 
Adrianople.  The  Sultan  opposed,  and  his  resistance,  supported 
by  England  and  France,  led  Russia  to  the  third  intervention 
in  the  Near  East,  i.e.,  to  the  Crimean  War.  This  war  was 
terminated  by  the  taking  of  Sevastopol  (1855)  and  the  Trea- 
ty of  Paris  (1856).  By  that  important  document  Russia 
reluctantly  consented  to  a  strict  limitation  of  her  arma- 
ments in  the  Black  Sea,  to  withdrawal  from  the  mouths  of 


4  RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  IN  THE  EAST 

the  Danube,  by  the  retrocession  of  Bessarabia,  and  finally 
to  a  renunciation  of  all  special  rights  of  intervention  between 
the  Sultan  and  his  Christian  subjects.  Tsar  Nicholas  did 
not  live  to  experience  this  humiliation,  as  he  died  of  grief 
before  this  treaty.  His  successor  was  Alexander  II. 

The  first  decade  of  Alexander's  reign  is  commonly 
known  as  the  Epoka  Velikih  Reform,  and  may  be  described 
as  a  violent  reaction  against  the  political  and  intellectual 
stagnation  of  the  preceding  period.  In  respect  of  external 
policy,  the  reign  of  Alexander  II  differed  widely  from  that 
of  Nicholas  I.  The  Eastern  Colossus  no  longer  inspired  ad- 
miration and  fear  in  Europe.  Until  the  country  had 
completely  recovered  from  the  exhaustion  of  the  Crimean 
War  the  government  remained  in  the  background  of 
European  politics;  the  Russian  minister  of  foreign 
affairs,  Prince  Gorchakov,  graphically  described  its  at- 
titude in  the  famous  declaration:  "La  Russie  ne  boude  pas, 
elle  se  recueille."  (  Russia  is  not  sulking,  she  is  collecting 
herself )  .  However,  during  this  recovery  Russia  suc- 
ceded  in  1871  to  secure  the  suppression  of  article  two  of  the 
Treaty  of  Paris,  which  limited  her  military  power  in  the 
Black  Sea.  Had  the  Tsar  been  satisfied  with  this  success, 
which  enabled  him  to  rebuild  Sevastopol  and  construct  a 
Black  Sea  fleet,  his  reign  might  have  been  a  peaceful  and 
prosperous  one.  But  he  tried  to  recover  the  remainder  of 
what  had  been  lost  by  the  Crimean  War,  the  province  of 
Bessarabia,  and  the  predominant  influence  in  Turkey.  To 
effect  this,  he  embarked  on  the  Turkish  War  of  1877  ,  and 
so  began  the  fourth  intervention  of  Russia  in  the  Near  East. 

The  Russo-Turkish  War  of  1877,  ended  in  severe  dis- 
appointment for  Russia.  Though  the  campaign  enabled 
her  to  recover  Bessarabia,  it  did  not  increase  her  prestige  in 
the  Balkans.  Serbia,  Montenegro,  Rumania,  and  Bulgaria, 
were  increased  territorially  by  this  war,  and  completely 
liberated,  but  Russia  took,  so  to  speak,  nothing  for  herself 
in  Europe,  because  Austria-Hungary,  Germany,  and 


RUSSIA    IN    THE     NEAR    EAST  5 

England,  modified  her  preliminary  Treaty  of  San  Stefano, 
at  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  in  favor  of  Turkey.  Tsar  Alexan- 
der II  was  especially  irritated  by  the  fact  that  the  two 
powers  that  were  thus  depriving  him  of  the  fruits  of  his 
victories  found  means  to  slice  off  a  share  for  themselves. 
Under  the  pretext  of  administering  their  affairs,  Austria 
occupied  Bosnia  -  Herzegovina,  and  by  a  separate  treaty 
England  secured  the  island  of  Cyprus,  as  well  as  a  controlling 
situation  in  Anatolia. 

After  thirty  years  of  occupation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the  annexation  of  these  two  provinces  by  Austria-Hungary 
followed  in  1908.  Serbia  and  Montenegro  protested  to  sig- 
natory powers.  Sir  Edward  Grey  declared  that  annexation 
violated  and  nullified  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  He  arranged 
for  a  new  European  congress  or  conference  to  be  held  for 
the  revision  of  the  treaty.  Baron  Aehrenthal,  Austrian 
foreign  minister,  refused  the  proposition,  and  consented  to 
pay  Turkey  an  indemnity  of  65,000,000  francs.  These 
negotiations  took  place  in  January  and  February  1909,  and 
the  protocol  embodying  the  above  terms  between  the  two 
countries  was  signed  on  February  26.  It  was  approved  by 
Turkey  on  April  5,  after  a  debate  of  nine  hours  in  the 
Turkish  chamber. 

Russia,  weakened  by  the  Japanese  War  and  absorbed  by 
constitutional  reforms,  was  not  at  this  time  able  to  encourage 
Serbian  and  Montenegrin  warlike  agitations  against  Austria. 
She  urged  them  to  moderate  their  aspirations  and  to 
prepare  for  better  times.  The  aggressive  foreign  policy  of 
Austria  now  opened  the  eyes  not  only  of  the  Balkan  states, 
but  also  of  Russia.  Armaments  and  preparations  for  war 
began  immediately  after  the  annexation.  In  the  work  of 
restoring  its  military  power  the  government  was  supported 
by  the  Duma.  In  this  manner  Russia  counterbalanced  the 
Austrian  and  German  militarism  which  had  been  enormous- 
ly strengthened  after  the  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina. 


6  RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  IN  THE  EAST 

Rivalry  between  Slavonic  and  Germanic  powers  for 
political  preponderance  in  the  Balkans,  especially  between 
Russia  and  Austria,  was  not  new  in  European  history.  It 
existed  even  before  the  reign  of  Catherine  II,  and  Joseph  II 
of  Austria.  Russia  strove  to  force  her  way  to  the  great 
midland  sea  and  obtain  a  footing  in  the  world  markets  to 
which  that  commercial  route  leads.  This  egress  from  the 
dreary  region  of  frost  and  ice  to  the  lands  of  sunshine  and 
fertility  was  ever  felt  as  a  prime  necessity  of  national  life.  It 
is  clear  that  for  political  and  economic  reasons,  and  notably 
for  racial  motives,  Russia  could  never  allow  Constantinople 
to  fall  into  the  hands  of  any  European  power,  nor  could 
she  allow  the  Balkans  to  fall  under  the  ascendancy  of 
Austria-Hungary  or  Germany.  Austria-Hungary  for  her- 
self spoke  in  very  much  the  same  strain.  In  a  leading  Vien- 
na paper,  one  which  usually  reflects  with  fair  accuracy 
the  opinions  of  Ballplatz  diplomacy,  appeared  on  No- 
vember 5,  1908,  an  article  which  stated  Austrian  policy 
avowedly  and  frankly: 

"The  thing  is  urgent,  and  we  must  be  resolute.  We 
cannot  halt  in  the  path  marked  out  for  us  without 
incurring  the  most  serious  peril.  We  cannot  return  the 
sword  to  the  scabbard  until  we  have  established  on  a 
secure  basis  our  absolute  supremacy  in  the  Balkans,  and 
crushed  in  those  lands  the  influence  of  every  other  power. 
To  accomplish  this  is  essential.  But  we  can  only  achieve 
this  on  condition  that  we  border  on  Turkey,  on  the  longest 
possible  front.  Especially  must  we  establish  ourselves  on 
the  border  of  Macedonia.  The  sine  qua  non  for  this  is 
disappearance  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro;  a  conflict 
must  be  forced,  and  that  speedily,  on  these  countries. 
Ruthless  selfishness  is  the  only  course  that  pays  in 
politics.  Ethical  considerations  should  not  affect  the 
attainment  of  a  political  aim;  to  reach  our  aim  no  means 
must  be  despised."  (Quoted  by  H.  J.  Darnton-Fraser  in 
The  Westminster  Review,  February,  1909.) 

It  was  obvious  that  Austria  desired  either  to  take  Con- 
stantinople, or  to  prevent  Russia  from  doing  so.  The 
acute  tension  in  diplomatic  relations  between  these  two 


Dower 


RUSSIA    IN    THE    NEAR    EAST 


powers  continued  for  several  years.  In  1912  Russia  succeded 
in  forming  a  Balkan  League  against  Turkey.  She  favored 
a  union  of  the  Balkan  Slavs  with  Greece,  which  would 
give  her  access  to  the  southeastern  ports  in  Aegean  Sea. 
Austria  opposed  such  a  policy  and  desired  to  preserve  the 
status  quo,  by  which  she  hoped  eventually  to  gain  more 
Slavonic  territory  and  to  be  united  with  her  own  Slavic 
dominions  in  a  Trialism.  This  was  a  dream  of  Archduke 
Franz  Ferdinand  and  his  militaristic  party.  Russian  policy 
in  accord  with  the  Triple  Entente  triumphed  in  the  Balkan 
War.  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  Greece,  and  Montenegro,  increased 
territorially.  Serbia  captured  Drach  (Durazzo)  on  the  Ad- 
riatic Sea,  and  insisted  on  retaining  this  seaport  with  a 
small  strip  of  the  adjacent  coast ,  in  order  to  have  an  outlet, 
"a  little  window,"  on  the  Adriatic.  Russia  and  other  powers 
of  the  Triple  Entente  actively  sympathized  with  the  Serbian 
claims;  Austria  and  the  Triple  Alliance  again  opposed, 
especially  Austria  which  had  economic  and  political  interests 
in  Albania  and  did  not  desire  to  encounter  Serbian  compe- 
tition there.  She  insisted  that  new  Albania,  since,  it 
manifestly  could  not  remain  Turkish,  should  be  formed 
into  an  autonomous  principality  under  her  political 
-protectorate.  The  state  of  European  alliances  caused 
Germany  to  champion  the  policy  of  Austria-Hungary,  and 
brought  France  and  Great  Britain  to  the  support  of  Russia. 
Only  the  earnest  endeavors  of  all  the  foreign  chancellories 
of  Europe  succeded  in  effecting  a  compromise  of  these 
conflicting  purposes  and  thus  temporarily  preventing  a 
general  war. 

In  1913  there  came  the  conflict  between  Bulgaria  and 
her  former  allies,  Serbia,  Greece,  and  Montenegro,  in 
consequence  of  the  partition  of  territory  gained  in  European 
Turkey.  Austria  without  hesitation  encouraged  Bulga- 
ria in  her  demands,  while  the  Russian  Tsar  telegraphed  to 
the  rulers  of  Southern  Slavs  to  find  some  method  to  avoid 
a  fratricidal  war,  reminding  them  of  his  position  as  arbitra- 


8  RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  IN  THE  EAST 

tor  under  the  Balkan  Treaty  of  1912,  and  warned  them 
that  he  would  hold  that  state  responsible  which  appealed 
to  force.  "The  state  which  begins  war  will  be  responsible 
to  the  Slavonic  cause"--  he  said.  In  Vienna  it  was  looked 
upon  as  an  indirect  assertion  of  moral  guardianship  of 
Russia  over  the  Balkan  states.  The  Austrian  and  German 
press  insisted  again  that  Balkan  Slavs  were  of  age  and 
could  take  care  of  themselves;  if  not,  it  was  for  Europe,  not 
for  Oriental  Russia,  to  control  them.  (Cf.  Die  Gegenwart, 
Berlin,  March  8,  1913. ) 

The  well-meant  action  of  Russia  in  intervening  in  Balkan 
affairs  had  an  effect  opposite  to  that  hoped  for.  The  political 
horizon  grew  darker  and  darker,  not  only  in  the  Balkans, 
but  in  all  Europe.  The  Treaty  of  Bucharest  of  1913,  at  the 
close  of  the  second  Balkan  War,  was  concluded  without 
much  regard  .to  the  nationalities  of  the  people  in  the  dis- 
tributed territories,  and  still  less  regard  for  the  political 
and  economic  interests  of  the  individual  states.  By  Aus- 
trian intervention  Skadar  (Skutari)  was  taken  from  Mon- 
tenegro and  ceded  to  Albania,  a  state  which  Austria  had 
just  created.  Serbia  in  particular,  cut  off  for  many  years 
from  the  Adriatic  and  Aegean  Sea,  felt  now  that  she  had 
a  wonderful  opportunity  to  secure  Drach,  or  some  other 
seaport  which  would  give  her  territorial  and  commercial 
access  to  the  Mediterranean.  But  her  desires  were  frus- 
trated and  her  political,  economic,  and  national  aspirations 
brought  to  naught. 

When  we  glance  generally  over  Russia's  foreign  policy 
for  a  hundred  years,  from  Alexander  I  in  1815,  to  Ni- 
cholas II  in  1915,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  all  interventions, 
all  the  wars  undertaken  in  the  Near  East,  have  ended  in 
very  meagre  results.  Four  great  wars  against  Turkey  have 
brought  Russia  only  a  strip  of  Rumanian  territory  between 
the  Dniester  and  the  Pruth,  and  another  Rumanian  bit 
of  land  in  the  delta  of  the  Danube.  Even  this  last  morsel, 
acquired  in  1829  and  restored  in  1856,  was  won  back  in  1878 


RUSSIA    IN    THE    NEAR    EAST  9 

at  the  cost  of  200,000  men  lost  in  a  terrible  war.  Russia, 
whose  fleets  have  twice — at  Navarino  in  1827,  and  at 
Sevastopol  in  1854  —  annihilated  the  naval  power  of  Tur- 
key, did  not  secure  even  an  island  in  the  Aegean  Sea. 
In  regard  to  satisfaction  of  a  moral  character,  the 
Russian  soldiers  have  never  been  able  to  enter  Stambul, 
nor  to  pray  in  St.  Sophia.  As  to  gratitude  upon  the  part  of 
the  liberated  Balkan  peoples,  Matushka  (  Dear-Mother  ) 
was  always  rewarded  with  a  series  of  disillusionments,  which 
rewards  mostly  came  from  Bulgaria. 

The  real  gain  for  Russia  in  the  Near  East,  as  has  been 
said,  was  slight  as  far  as  expansion  was  concerned.  For 
a  hundred  years  this  powerful  Northern  Empire  did  not 
obtain  one  foot  of  territory  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  But  in 
the  direction  of  the  Caucasus,  Persia,  Afghanistan,  Tur- 
kestan, Siberia,  Mongolia,  Manchuria,  and  China  —  she 
made  a  real  gain.  Russia  secured  there  an  enormous  increase 
of  territory,  and  an  aggrandizement  of  influence  greater 
than  what  one  might  deem  that  she  ever  will  have  in  the 
Balkans  when  a  new  day  dawns  after  the  present  European 
Walpurgis  night  of  slaughter. 


CHAPTER   II 
RUSSIA^IN  THE  MIDDLE  EAST. 

For  a  few  parcels  of  territory  in  the  West,  conquered  with 
tremendous  difficulty,  what  bloody  wars  has  Russia  not 
endured?  Her  efforts  to  obtain  access  to  the  sea  have  been 
but  half  successful.  The  White  Sea,  blocked  with  ice;  the 
Baltic,  closed  by  the  Sound  and  the  Belts;  the  Black  Sea 
closed  by  the  Dardanelles;  and  the  Mediterranean  itself, 
with  Gibraltar  and  Suez  Canal,  --  are  not  available,  and 
not  sufficient  for  the  needs  of  the  expansion  of  a  mighty 
continental  empire.  In  Asia,  on  the  contrary,  by  way  of 
Persia,  the  Tigris,  and  the  Persian  Gulf,  Russia  is  able  to 
open  her  way  to  the  Arabian  Sea.  Bismarck  once  spoke  in. 
disdain  of  the  mission  of  Russia  in  Asia.  But  when  young 
Emperor  Nicholas  II  ascended  the  throne,  he  and  his  minis- 
ters took  matters  more  seriously.  In  1893  a  Russian  publi- 
cist, Prince  Ukhtomski,  issued  a  book  ( Puteshestvie  na  Vostok 
Naslednika  Tsesarevichd),  in  which  he  stated  with  pride  that 
the  time  had  come  for  the  Russians  to  have  some  definite 
idea  regarding  the  heritage  that  the  Genghis  Khans  and  the 
Tamerlanes  have  left  them. "  Asia!  we  have  been  part  of  it  at 
all  times,"  he  said;  "we  have  lived  its  life  and  shared  its  in- 
terests; our  geographical  position  irrevocably  destines  us  to 
be  the  head  of  the  rudimentary  powers  of  the  Orient". 

The  opinion  of  Prince  Ukhtomski  revealed  a  new  element 
in  Russian  foreign  policy.  Gradually,  step  by  step,  town  by 
town,  and  district  by  district,  Russia  won  her  influence 
in  numerous  khanates,  amirates,  satrapies,  and  other  Asiatic 
provinces.  She  annexed  Khiva  in  1872,  Bokhara  in  1873, 


RUSSIA    IN    THE    MIDDLE    EAST  11 

and   Caucasus  in  1878.  She  won    political  and  commercial 
influence  in  Turkey,  Afghanistan,  and  Persia. 

By  these  Russian  successes  in  Asia,  England  was  greaty 
alarmed.  At  every  forward  movement  of  the  Muscovites, 
the  Britons  protested,  or  endeavored  to  secure  guarantees 
against  a  new  advance,  or  tried  to  gain  for  themselves  some 
new  strategic  point  that  would  strengthen  their  position.  In 
1885  the  belief  was  general  that  a  war  was  about  to  ensue 
between  "the  Whale  and  the  Elephant".  But  three  years 
later,  Great  Britain  agreed  to  the  Russian  occupation  of 
Merv,  Penjdeh,  and  Kushk.  The  Russians  now  were  within 
one  hundred  miles  of  Herat  —  "the  Key  of  the  Indies". 

The  question  of  the  settlement  of  the  boundaries  was 
scarcely  disposed  of,  when  another  problem  arose  concerning 
the  settlement  of  the  boundaries  of  the  Pamirs,  a  moun- 
tainous region  of  Central  Asia  lying  on  the  northwest  border 
of  India.  With  the  Bam-Dunya  ("the  Roof  of  the  World") 
the  platau  of  Pamirs  commands  both  Afghanistan  and  Cash- 
mere, those  two  ramparts  of  India  and  Chinese  Turkestan. 
The  region  was  broken  up  into  petty  khanates  over  which 
the  khan  of  Bokhara,  the  vassal  of  the  Russians,  and  the 
amir  of  Afghanistan,  the  client  of  the  English,  laid  claim  to 
sovereignty.  Non  of  them  had  recognized  until  then  the 
value  of  the  territory.  In  the  summer  of  1891  a  Russian 
scientific  mission  accompanied  by  six  hundred  soldiers, 
made  its  appearance  in  Pamir,  and  aroused,  by  its  presence 
there,  protests  of  the  English.  At  the  approach  of  winter, 
the  Russians  withdrew;  but  the  following  summer  they 
again  appeared  there,  under  the  command  of  Colonel  Ya- 
nov.  They  contended  that  they  had  been  insulted  by  the  Af- 
ghans, for  which  they  inflicted  upon  them  the  bloody  defeat 
of  Somatash,  after  which  they  fell  back  and  took  up  their 
position  at  Kalabar  on  the  Oxus.  This  clash  of  arms  was 
succeded  by  a  diplomatic  controversy.  It  was  not  until  1895, 
after  a  keen  discussion  between  the  two  great  powers,  each 
contending  for  its  own  client,  that  they  reached  an  ag- 


12  R  USSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  IN  THE  EAST 

reement.  The  disputed  region  was  divided  between  Bokhara 
and  Afghanistan,  the  former  receiving  the  little  khanates  of 
Shugnan  and  Rushan,  and  the  latter  the  khanate  of  Wakhan, 
a  narrow  strip  of  territory,  about  twenty  miles  wide,  which 
now  forms  "  a  buffer  state"  between  Russia  and  Bri- 
tish India. 

In  1899  England  occupied  in  Arabia  the  island  of  Perim 
in  order  to  control  the  outlet  of  the  Red  Sea  and  establish 
a  coaling  station  in  her  maritime  route.  Russia,  in  the  same 
year,  endeavored  to  obtain  from  the  imam  the  grant  of  a 
coaling  station  on  his  coast.  From  this  arose  new  com- 
plaints and  strenuous  opposition  on  the  part  of  England, 
especially  when  Russia  established  herself  on  the  coast,  and 
at  the  very  capital  of  the  emperor  of  Abyssinia. 

The  English  began  staidly  to  alternate  between  doubting 
and  believing  that  these  expansions  of  Russia  by  way  of  the 
Caucasus,  by  way  of  Turkestan,  and  by  way  of  the  Pa- 
mirs, were  all  directed  towards  one  goal,  to  possess  "the  ri- 
ches of  the  Indies."  Some  English  jingoists  declared  that 
the  conquest  of  all  the  Levant  was  worthless  for  Russia,  if 
it  would  not  open  the  road  to  India.  Russian  diplomacy 
denied  such  innuendos.  "We  do  not  desire  India,  but  must 
get  down  to  the  Persian  Gulf"--  contended  Novoe  Vremya 
(April  28,  1901),  a  leading  conservative  Russian  paper.  In 
truth,  what  Russia  desired  was  not  a  road  to  India,  but 
a  road  to  the  Arabian  Sea,  and  to  reach  that  point  the  route 
lay  through  the  Persian  Gulf.  She  accepted  the  theory  that 
in  Asia  there  is  room  enough  for  two  powers,"  if  they  find 
a  modus  operandi  to  move  there  in  parallel  lines  without 
colliding. 

The  modus  operandi  between  the  two  rivals  was  not  found 
until  Germany  compelled  them  to  find  it.  The  German  plan 
for  the  Bagdad  railroad  was  regarded  for  many  years  as  an 
impracticable  enterprise.  But  when  a  part  of  it  was  opened 
between  Constantinople  and  P>egli  in  Central  Turkey,  and 
when  Germany  was  preparing  to  continue  the  railway  con- 


RUSSIA    IN    THE     MIDDLE    EAST  13 

struction  with  a  terminus  at  Persian  Gulf,  England  realised 
that  the  German  Drang  nach  Osten  was  not  illusion  but  fact* 
The  basis  for  Anglo-Russian  agreement  in  the  Middle  East 
was  now  found.  Russia,  not  being  at  the  zenith  of  her  milita- 
ry and  political  effectiveness,  condescended  to  an  arrange- 
ment by  which  the  situation  in  Persia  and  Afghanistan  was 
cleared  up.  By  this  arrangement  Great  Britain  consented  to 
seek  no  political  or  commercial  concessions  north  of  a  line 
connecting  Kasrishirin,  Ispahan,  Yezd,  Tabbas,  and  Khaf, 
with  the  junction  of  the  Russian,  Persian,  and  Afghan  fron- 
tiers. Russia  gave  to  Great  Britain  a  like  understanding  in 
respect  of  the  territory  south  of  a  line  extending  from  the 
Afghan  frontier  to  Birjand,  Kirman,  and  Bander  Abbas- 
The  region  between  these  two  lines  was  to  be  regarded  as  a 
neutral  zone  in  which  either  country  might  obtain  conces- 
sions. It  is  of  interest  to  note  how  Russia  admitted  the  Bri- 
tish sphere  of  influence  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  renouncing  her 
claims  in  that  part  of  Persia  which  she  had  coveted  for  so 
many  decades. 

In  Afghanistan  the  British  and  Russians  reached  an 
entente  cordiale  by  which  England  was  to  exercise  her 
influence  in  that  amirate  only  in  a  pacific  sense,  viz.,  never 
to  permit  Afghanistan  to  take  any  measures  threatening 
Russia.  England  also  engaged  neither  to  occupy  nor  to 
annex,  in  contravention  of  that  treaty,  any  portion  of  Afgha- 
nistan, nor  to  interfere  in  the  internal  administration  of  the 
country.  The  statesmen  of  Russia,  on  their  part,  declared 
that  they  recognized  Afghanistan  as  outside  the  sphere 
of  Russian  influence,  and  they  agreed  to  conduct  all 
their  political  relations  with  Afghanistan  only  through 
the  intermediary  of  the  British  Government.  In  commercial 
relations  the  two  governments  affirmed  their  adherence  to 
the  principle  of  equal  opportunity,  and  they  agreed  that  any 
facilities  which  might  have  been,  or  should  hereafter  be, 
obtained  for  British  and  British-Indian  trade,  should  be 
equally  enjoyed  by  Russian  trade  and  traders, 


14  RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  IN     THE  EAST 

This  agreement,  which  was  confessedly  drawn  up  for  the 
sake  of  a  solid  and  lasting  peace  between  the  two  em- 
pires concerned,  evoked  a  mixture  of  sullen  criticisms  in 
the  English  and  Russian  press.  It  was  said  that  certain 
stipulations  of  this  convention  did  more  harm  than  good 
to  the  British  interests  in  the  Middle  Orient.  Some  English 
politicians  objected  that  Russia  obtained  in  Persia,  for 
her  sphere  of  influence,  about  two-thirds  of  the  country, 
with  its  richest  and  largest  towns,  including  Teheran  the 
capital;  that  she  had  become  indisputable  master  of  the 
centres  of  trade,  of  the  oldest  and  best  routes  in  Persia;  that 
in  Afghanistan  she  had  a  free  hand  to  let  her  officers  confer 
with  Afghan  officers  in  " non-political"  matters;  and  finally, 
that  her  appointed  commercial  agents  in  the  amir's  country 
would  not  promote  or  safeguard  English  interests  in 
the  matter  of  trrade. 

In  Russia  the  compact  was  criticized  only  by  warm-water 
publicists  of  the  forward  policy,  who  alleged  that  the  Eng- 
lish had  no  sincere  intention  in  concluding  such  an  agreement. 
It  was  England,  they  asserted,  that  had  blocked  the  way  of 
Russian  efforts  to  reach  the  ocean;  it  was  England  that 
thwarted  Russia's  aim  in  the  Crimean  War  to  go  to  the 
Mediterranean.  TheA!  averred  it  was  Lord  G.  Curzon's 
firm  Persian  policy  that  arrested  Russia's  outflow  to- 
wards a  seaport  on  the  Persian  Gulf,  which  necessarily  and 
properly  was  her  right.  The  first  Anglo-Japanese  Treaty  of 
1902,  according  to  these  contestants,  was  the  death  blow  to 
the  Russian  Pacific  open-water  projects.  Said  convention 
does  not  grant  Russia  any  outlook  towards  the  Persian 
Gulf,  the  summum  desiderium  of  her  foreign  policy  in  the 
Middle  East,  because  she  conceded  to  give  up  of  her  rail- 
road proposed  from  Meshed  to  Bander  Abbas. 

There  are  other  similar  arguments  pro  and  con  this  con- 
vention, but  whatever  they  may  be,  the  fact  remains  that 
the  two  signatory  powers  were  not  compelled  either  by 
threatening  diplomatic  complications  to  appeal  to  a  peace 


RUSSIA    IN    THE    MIDDLE    EAST  15 

arbitration  tribunal  or  by  force  of  arms  to  sign  a  treaty  of 
peace.  They  voluntarily  and  with  earnest  solicitude 
on  both  sides  entered  into  the  compact,  to  remove  certain 
prejudice,  mistrust,  and  resentment  for  injuries  inflicted 
on  each  other  in  previous  times.  The  Russian  public  in 
general,  regarded  England  prior  to  this  time  as  perfide 
Albion  with  whom  it  was  not  worthy  to  make  any  alliance 
or  treaty.  In  the  eyes  of  the  English,  Russia  was  considered 
as  a  semi-civilized  nation  ruled  by  autocrats  and  aristo- 
crats, which  was  known  in  Weltpolitik  by  her  quick  forget- 
fulness  of  given  promises,  and  which  is  wholly  built  upon 
warfare  and  conquest.  Such  misunderstandings  between  the 
two  powers  had  really  existed  for  many  decades,  and  these 
were  removed  by  that  agreement. 

To  Persia,  the  Anglo-Russian  Convention  of  1907  was 
more  benevolent  than  some  critics  supposed.  If  the  rivalry 
between  England  and  Russia  had  remained  as  acute  as  it 
was  in  earlier  times,  Persia,  with  her  constant  troubles  and 
her  inefficiency  for  self-government,  would  have  been 
plunged  into  civil  war  and  finally  become  dismembered 
like  an  Asiatic  Poland. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  European  War  in  1914,  and  lat- 
terly in  1915,  both  Persia  and  Afghanistan  were  advised  by 
Turks  and  Germans  to  take  arms  and  overthrow  the 
Russian  and  British  protectorate.  German  and  Austrian 
agents,  taking  advantage  of  their  diplomatic  immunity, 
attempted  to  convince  Persia  and  Afghanistan  that  if  they 
wished  to  preserve  their  national  existence  when  the  Euro- 
pean gigantic  strife  of  nations  ends,  they  must  not  remain 
neutral.  "If  England  and  Russia  issue  victorious  in  this 
war,  then  Persia  and  Afghanistan  will  be  wiped  off  the  map, 
and  their  national  existence  finished  for  ever"  -  wrote  the 
Turkish  paper  Tanine  of  Constantinople.  The  British  and 
Russian  representatives  complained  that  these  Austro- 
German  and  Turkish  agitations  clashed  with  the  rights  of 
Russia  and  England  as  protecting  powers  of  Persia  and  Af- 


16  RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  IN  THE  EAST 

ghanistan.  Precautionary  measures  against  foreign  in- 
trigues were  taken  immediately.  Russia  and  Great  Britain 
warned  the  Persian  shah  ("  the  King  of  Kings")  and  the 
Afghan  amir  that  any  act  of  hostility  towards  the  British  or 
Russian  Empire  might  mean  the  end  of  independence  of 
their  respective  countries.  Fortunately  for  the  shah  and  his 
people,  all  these  foreign  instigations  failed  of  success,  and 
Persia  declined  in  1914  and  1915  to  join  officially  either 
belligerent  party. 


CHAPTER  III 
RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST. 

In  relation  to  the  Far  East,  the  contact  of  the  Rus- 
sians with  the  Asiatic  peoples  has  existed  more  than  two 
hundred  years,  especially  with  China.  From  the  annexation 
of  the  Kamchatka  Peninsula,  the  position  of  Russia  in 
the  Far  East  continually  grew  stronger.  In  1847  the  Russian 
Government  appointed  for  governor-general  of  Eastern 
Siberia,  Count  Nicholas  Muraviev,  who  later  was  named,  in 
reward  for  his  services,  Muraviev- Amurski.  When  Muraviev 
took  this  position  he  set  himself  to  develop  and  strengthen 
the  eastern  colonies.  He  knew  that  his  new  province  would 
have  no  future  if  it  was  not  secured  by  the  chief  river  and 
the  richest  region,  that  is,  the  Amur  and  Manchuria. 
In  1848  Russia  sent  an  expedition  of  exploration  to  the  Far 
East,  but  all  this  expedition  perished  without  the  escape  of 
a  single  man  to  tell  the  story. 

Two  years  afterwards  Captain  Nevelski  with  his  explo- 
rers discovered  the  island  Sakhalin,  occupied  the  mouth  of 
the  Amur,  and  gave  a  proclamation  to  the  native  Chinese 
mandarins  that  all  this  region  belonged  to  "the  White  Tsar" 
at  Petersburg.  They  protested  and  demanded  that  nego- 
tiations should  be  entered  upon  with  their  emperor.  Gover- 
nor Muraviev  declined  the  proposition  because  "Peking  was 
two  far  away,  and  Chinese  diplomacy  too  slow."  He 
continued  to  act  as  if  the  country  was  already  a  Russian 
province,  and  strengthened  his  position  by  building  along 
the  river  the  forts  Aleksandrovsk,  Khabarovsk,  and  Ni- 
kolaevsk. 


18  RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  IN  THE  EAST 

During  the  Crimean  War  the  Anglo-French  fleet  blockaded 
the  Russian  Pacific  coast,  and  destroyed  a  part  of  the 
military  establishments  there.  This  blockade,  by  threate- 
ning to  starve  out  the  colony,  only  hastened  a  decision 
on  the  part  of  Muraviev,  who  had  need  of  Manchuria  to 
furnish  food  for  his  colonists.  In  1857  Admiral  Putiatin 
dropped  anchor  in  the  Pechili  Gulf,  and  proposed  to  the 
emperor  of  China,  in  consideration  of  Russia's  armed  inter- 
vention in  the  Taiping  insurrection,  the  cession  of  Manchu- 
ria. China's  only  reply  was  a  vigorous  protest  against  this 
Russian  encroachment.  War  seemed  imminent  between  the 
two  empires.  Happily  for  the  Russian  eagle,  just  at 
that  time  came  the  Anglo-French  expedition  and  the  march 
of  the  allies  upon  Peking.  The  Russians  profited  by  this 
event  to  complete  the  annexation  of  the  coveted  province. 
The  Tsar  sent  a  fleet  into  the  Chinese  waters,  and  the 
Celestials  did  not  relish  having  a  third  European  power  to 
deal  with.  By  the  treaties  of  Aigun  and  Tientsin  of  1858, 
they  granted  to  Russia  the  entire  left  bank  of  the  Amur, 
and  all  the  territory  between  this  river  and  the  Pacific 
Ocean.  In  the  southern  part  the  Russians  built  a  fort- 
ress and  a  city  with  a  prophetic  name  Vladivostok  (Do- 
minator  of  the  East).  The  acquired  lands  formed  two 
provinces,  Amurskaya  Oblast  (the  Amur  Province)  west  of 
the  Amur,  and  Primorskaya  Oblast  (the  Maritime  Province) 
east  of  that  river.  By  the  Treaty  of  Peking  in  1860,  China 
ceded  to  Russia  the  region  adjacent  to  the  lakes  Balkhash 
and  Issik-kul.  The  boundary  line  between  Manchuria  and 
Siberia  was  readjusted,  and  the  Russians  were  granted  the 
right  to  trade  in  all  parts  of  the  empire.  Fifteen  years  after- 
wards Russia  obtained  from  Japan  the  abandonment  of  the 
latter's  rights  over  Sakhalin,  in  exchange  for  the  North 
Kurile  Islands. 

For  nearly  thirty  years  the  boundary  between  China  and 
Russia  remained  as  agreed  upon  in  the  treaties  of  1858 
and  1860;  but  already  the  commercial  and  political  activity 
of  the  Russians  was  overstepping  it.  They  had  established 


RUSSIA    IN    THE    FAR    EAST  19 

themselves  in  large  numbers  in  towns  of  Chinese  Manchuria, 
in  Kiakhta,  Mukden,  Kirin,  and  Tsitsihar.  The  navigation 
of  the  Ussuri  and  Sungari  rivers  fell  wholty  into  their  hands. 
The  steamships  of  the  Amur  Company  put  Russia  in  rapid 
communication  with  Japan  and  San  Francisco.  Scientific 
missions  traversed  China  in  all  directions.  At  Peking  the 
Russian  colony  acquired  a  continually  greater  importance; 
the  ambassador  of  the  Tsar  wielded  more  influence  at  court 
than  the  representatives  of  any  other  European  power.  His 
open-handed  liberality  won  him  the  favor  of  the  courtiers, 
mandarins,  and  the  generals.  In  all  the  sea  and  rivers*  ports 
the  colonies  of  Russian  merchants  multiplied,  and  these 
seemed  to  live  on  better  terms  with  the  native  population 
than  the  traders  of  other  foreign  nations. 

In  1881  Russia  secured  great  economic  concessions  and 
privileges  in  the  provinces  bordering  on  Siberia  and  Tur- 
kestan. By  the  Hi  Treaty  Russia  and  China  agreed  that  no 
tariff  was  to  be  imposed  by  either  of  them,  unless  trade 
attains  "such  development  as  to  necessitate  its  establish- 
ment." Free  trade,  according  to  this  treaty,  was  to  be  main- 
tained between  all  Chinese  and  Russian  subjects  in  the 
principal  towns  and  trading  areas  of  Mongolia  and  Chinese 
Turkestan.  Also,  the  treaty  confirmed  that  Russian  subjects 
had  the  right  to  settle  and  to  acquire  houses,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  carrying  on  trade  in  all  trading  places  on  either  side 
of  the  Tianshan  ranges  and  in  the  country  outside  the 
great  Chinese  Wail. 

By  the  convention  of  June,  1895,  China  contracted  with 
Russia,  through  the  intermediary  of  the  Russo  -  Chinese 
Bank  at  Petersburg,  and  under  the  direction  of  Count 
Ukhtomski,  a  loan  of  four  hundred  million  francs  at  four 
per  cent.,  payable  in  thirty-six  years.  On  August  27,  1896 
this  same  bank  made  another  agreement  with  the  Chinese 
Government  (the  Treaty  of  St.  Petersburg).  This  treaty 
gave  the  Eastern  Chinese  Railroad  Company  the  right  to 
carry  the  Siberian  railway  through  Chinese  Manchuria 


20  RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  IN  THE  EAST 

and  the  Liaotung  Peninsula,  with  a  terminus  at  Talienwan 
and  Port  Arthur.  Another  purpose  of  the  loan  was  to 
develop  coal,  iron,  and  gold  mines  in  the  territory  traversed 
by  the  road.  The  stock  of  the  company  was  held  only  by 
Chinese  and  Russians.  A  special  clause  authorized  the  Tsar 
to  station  in  Manchuria  both  infantry  and  cavalry  for  the 
protection  of  the  railroad,  which  at  the  end  of  twenty-five 
years  was  to  revert  to  China,  in  case  she  desired  it  after 
having  fulfilled  all  her  obligations.  Having  secured  the  right 
to  construct  this  line  of  railway,  Count  Cassini  had  little 
difficulty  in  inducing  the  Government  of  Peking  to  allow 
certain  deviations  of  the  road  so  as  to  bring  it  into  touch 
with  Tsitsihar,  Kharbin,  and  Vladivostok. 

This  matter  was  hardly  settled  between  China  and  Rus- 
sia, before  some  other  differences  arose  between  China  and 
Germany.  On  November  1,  1897,  two  German  missionaries 
had  been  murdered  by  the  Chinese  ruffians  in  the  province 
of  Shantung.  Such  an  outrageous  act  now  gave  a  plausible 
pretext  for  the  German  Government  to  occupy  the  harbor 
of  Kiaochow.  For  Russia  this  was  a  most  unwelcome  in- 
cident. She  had  intended  Kiaochow  for  her  own  purposes, 
and  had  already  made  an  agreement  with  the  authorities  in 
Peking  that  the  harbor  might  be  used  freely  by  her  fleet. 
The  Cabinet  of  Petersburg  hastened  to  demand,  therefore, 
as  an  offset  for  the  loss  of  Kiaochow,  a  lease  of  Port  Arthur 
and  Talienwan.  The  Chinese  Government  granted  the 
demands,  and  the  Russians  now  had  free  hand  to  use 
Port  Arthur  not  merely  as  railroad  station  but  as  a  place 
d'armes.  From  the  Korean  Government  they  obtained  a 
lease  of  the  port  of  Masampo  on  the  southeastern  coast  of 
Korea,  and  other  concessions  in  this  province. 

The  Russian  grandiose  scheme  in  the  Far  East  was  very 
carefully  laid,  and  for  a  time  it  was  favored  by  many  cir- 
cumstances. In  1900  the  Boxer  rising  in  China  and  the 
troubles  in  the  town  of  Blagovieshchensk,  justified  Russia 
in  sending  a  large  force  into  Manchuria,  to  protect  her  own 


RUSSIA    IN    THE    FAR    EAST  21 

interests  and  at  the  same  time  the  territorial  integrity  of 
the  Celestial  Empire  against  the  inordinate  demands  of  the 
western  powers  for  compensations  and  guarantees.  When 
the  Boxer  riots  were  silenced  General  Nicholas  Grodekov 
telegraphed  to  his  government  of  "  consolidating  the  great 
enterprise  of  annexing  the  whole  of  the  Amur  to  Russia's 
dominions,  and  making  of  that  river  an  internal  waterway 
and  not  a  frontier  stream."  His  proposition  was  accepted  as 
it  concerned  the  right  bank  of  the  Amur.  "The  Son  of  Hea- 
ven" was  assured  that  whatever  might  come  to  pass  in 
Manchuria " no  part  of  China  should  be  annexed  to  Russia". 
Moreover,  Russian  diplomats  in  Peking  made  with  the 
Chinese  Government  a  secret  agreement  (1900)  by  which 
Russia  undertook  to  protect  China  from  foreign  invasion^ 
and  to  dismantle  all  forts  and  defenses  not  occupied  by  the 
Russians.  Niuchwang  and  other  places,  according  to  that 
agreement,  were  to  be  restored  to  the  Chinese  administraton 
when  the  Russian  Government  was  satisfied  that  the 
pacification  of  the  province  was  complete. 

The  existence  of  such  an  agreement  was  denied  by  Count 
Lamsdorf,  the  Russian  foreign  minister,  to  both  the  British 
and  Japanese  ambassadors  at  Petersburg.  But  in  spite  of 
Count  Lamsdorf's  disavowal,  this  clandestine  agreement 
with  China  on  one  hand,  and  the  Russian  general  policy  in 
Manchuria,  on  the  other,  excited  suspicion  in  Japan  and 
Great  Britain.  The  hostility  of  the  Japanese  was  stirred  up 
on  political  grounds,  while  the  English  were  jealous  to  see 
such  a  mighty  rival  as  Russia  in  the  Far  East.  For  that 
reason,  both  powers,  Japan  and  England,  astonishing  the 
world,  signed  in  January,  1902,  a  treaty  for  maintaining  the 
status  quo  and  general  peace  in  the  extreme  Orient.  The  trea- 
ty provided  that  the  integrity  of  China  and  Korea  must  be 
respected,  and  the  policy  of  open  door  for  commerce  and  in- 
dustry in  China  and  Korea  should  be  granted  to  all  nations. 

One  of  the  first  effects  of  this  Anglo-Japanese  Alliance 
was  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  peace  party  in  Russia, 


22  RUSSIAN  FOREIGN  POLICY  IN  THE  EAST 

resulting  in  a  new  treaty  with  China  (March  26,  1902), 
pledging  the  Russians  to  withdraw  from  Manchuria.  The 
evacuation  was  begun  shortly  afterwards  and  continued 
during  the  winter.  But  in  the  spring  of  1903,  this  process 
stopped.  The  Japanese  now  felt  that  it  was  high  time  to 
intervene.  Accordingly,  in  July,  1903,  they  addressed  an 
inquiry  to  Count  Lamsdorf,  asking  whether  he  was  disposed 
to  reopen  the  negotiations  on  the  Manchurian  and  Korean 
questions.  The  Russian  Government  vouchsafed  a  reply  in 
which  it  was  stated  that  Russia  was  willing  to  recognize  the 
preponderating  commercial  interest  of  Japan  in  Korea, 
as  well  as  her  right  to  advise  and  assist  that  country  in 
civil  administration.  Japan  was  further  to  be  at  liberty  to 
send  troops  for  this  purpose  to  "the  Hermit  Kingdom'' 
after  giving  notice  to  Russia.  Both  powers  were  to  agree  not 
to  use  the  territory  of  this  kingdom  for  strategic  purposes^ 
and  not  to  erect  any  fortifications  on  the  coast  calculated  to 
impair  the  freedom  of  the  straits  of  Korea.  The  question 
of  Manchuria  was  not  brought  into  this  scheme,  because  the 
Russian  Government  regarded  this  province  to  be  outside 
of  the  Japanese  sphere  of  interest.  The  answer  did  not  sa- 
tisfy Baron  Kamura,  the  Japanese  minister  of  foreign  af- 
fairs. After  six  months  of  dilatory  wranglings,  diplomacy 
had  exhausted  itself.  The  war  began  on  February  8,  1904, 
without  any  formal  declaration. 


CHAPTER    IV 

RUSSIAN  POLICY  AFTER  THE  JAPANESE  WAR. 

A  great  deal  of  nonsense  has  been  written  and  accepted  as 
true  concerning  the  Russo-Japanese  War  of  1904.  Through- 
out the  course  of  this  terrific  conflict,  the  Japanese  took 
the  best  of  care  to  put  their  own  view  of  the  case  before 
the  world.  "The  wonderful  heroism,"  "the  marvellous 
strategical  and  tactical  skill,"  "the  perfect  medical  and 
transport  arrangements  of  the  Japanese  forces,"  and  other 
set  phrases  received  more  than  a  fair  share  of  praise.  This 
was  due  to  the  perspicuous  industry  of  the  Japanese  publi- 
city agencies.  Those  who  believe  in  such  laurea  verba  forget 
that  Japan  had  advantage  of  Russia  in  being  better  prepared 
for  the  war;  she  was  equipped  with  a  full  war-chest,  a  ve- 
teran army  and  navy.  In  the  meantime  the  Russians  fought 
under  the  dispiriting  conditions  of  having  a  well-trained 
enemy  in  the  far  front  and  nearly  all  the  European  powers 
behind.  Austria,  Germany,  Italy,  and  Great  Britain 
intrigued  secretely  against  Russia,  especially  Austria  and 
Germany.  Furthermore,  in  internal  policy  the  vast  Slavonic 
Empire  was  threatened  by  a  revolutionary  movement.  The 
Russian  Government  was  hampered  at  every  turn  by  dis- 
orders. Nevertheless,  in  the  battlefield  the  Russians  put 
up  an  extraordinary  fight,  so  that  before  a  year  and  half  had 
passed  their  adversaries  were  completely  exhausted.  The 
Japanese  now  unofficially  suggested  to  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America  that  he  intervene  as  mediator. 
President  Roosevelt  accepted  the  suggestion,  and  his 
mediation  worked  successfully.  The  treaty  of  peace  between 


24  RUSSIAN  POLI   Y  AFTER  THE  JAPANESE  WAR 

Russia  and  Japan  was  concluded  September  5,  1905,  at 
Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire. 

Since  the  close  of  this  unfortunate  war  the  position 
of  Russia,  however,  was  not  doomed  either  in  Asia  or  in 
Europe.  Russian  policy  in  the  Far  East  was  generally  more 
successful  than  in  the  Near  East.  The  great  secret  of  this 
success  lay  on  the  method  employed  in  Russian  dealings 
with  the  Asiatic  peoples.  Prof.  Reinsch  observes  in  his 
suggestive  book,  World  Politics,  that  the  Russians  have 
an  insinuating  manner  and  great  tact  in  diplomatic  inter- 
course. In  their  Oriental  political  system  they  know  how  to 
use  that  splendor  and  concentrated  majesty  which  impress 
the  Oriental  mind  far  more  than  do  the  simple  business 
methods  of  the  Britons.  The  Russian  diplomats  understand 
very  well  how  to  use  the  amour-propre  of  their  adversaries. 
They  know  when  to  use  force,  and  when  to  soothe  up  with 
gracious  audiences,  Lucullan  banquets,  and  blandishments. 
Withal,  the  policy  of  Russia  is  persistently  opportune  and 
constant.  The  changes  in  ministry  of  foreign  affairs  are  not 
so  frequent  as  in  France,  England,  and  United  States  of 
America.  From  1815  to  1882  Russia  had  only  two  ministers 
for  foreign  affairs,  Nesselrode  and  Gorchakov;  and  since 
the  latter  date  there  have  been  only  six,  De  Giers,  Lobanov, 
Muraviev,  Lamsdorf,  Izvolsky,  and  Sazonov.  This  per- 
manency in  the  foreign  office  ensures  continuity  of  the  same 
political  views  and  consistence  in  realizing  them.  Russia 
secured  in  Asia  lands  and  influence  among  Oriental  nations 
only  by  her  peaceful  persistency,  not  by  belicose  means. 
Russian  policy  in  Far  Assia  showed  that  great  conquests 
can  be  achieved  not  only  by  the  land  battles  and  sea  fights, 
by  brag  proclamations,  and  oratorical  heroics,  but  rather 
by  silence  and  prudence. 

Of  like  opinion  is  Prof.  James  Mavor.  In  his  Economic 
History  of  Russia,  the  English  scholar  assumes  that  Central 
Asia  and  the  Far  East  contain  imense  possibilities  for  Rus- 
sia. At  the  present  time  she  has  privileges  and  concessions  to 


RUSSIA    IN    THE    FAR    EAST  25 

exploit  the  mining  industries  and  construct  the  railroads 
in  Manchuria  and  all  Mongolia.  According  to  Prof.  Ma- 
vor,  the  latter  has  already  become  in  reality  her  prote- 
gee under  the  Russo-Mongolian  Agreement  and  Protocol 
of  1912.  China  now  controls  solely  the  external  relations 
of  that  province.  All  internal  administration  is  left  to  the 
local  khans,  whose  chief  spiritual  ruler  is  the  khutuktu 
(saint) ;  and  this  "  saint"  is  simply  a  vassal  of  the  Slav  Tsar. 

Though  preocupied  with  political  and  civilizing  mission  in 
the  Far  Orient,  Russia  did  not  abandon  her  liberating 
mission  in  Central  and  Southeastern  Europe.  When  in 
May,  1912,  Mr.  S.  Sazonov  made  a  speech  in  the  Duma, 
he  declared,  amongst  other  statements,  in  the  reverse  of 
Prince  Ukhtomski's  opinion,  that  Russia  is  not  an  Asiatic, 
but  a  European  power.  "Our  State  was  put  together 
not  on  the  banks  of  the  Black  Irtish,  but  on  the  Dnieper 
and  the  Moskva"  —  he  asserted.  This  diplomatic  usus 
loquendi  translated  into  plain  language  signifies  that  expan- 
sion in  Asia  should  not  constitute  the  one  sole  aim  of  the 
foreign  policy  of  Russia,  for  she  has  to  protect,  not  only 
3,000,000  of  Mongols  from  unremittng  Chinese  raids,  but 
she  has  also  to  protect  50,000,000  of  her  minor  brethren, 
the  Slavonic  peoples  under  the  domination  of  Austro- 
Germans.  Situated  upon  the  outskirts  of  Europe,  in 
the  debatable  region  between  the  West  and  East,  she  is 
the  conecting  link  between  Occidental  civilization  and 
Oriental  barbarism.  The  double  eagle  of  Russia  is  the 
symbol  that  connects  the  Slavonic  fragments  in  a  racial 
bond  which  will  spell  in  future  peaceful  progress  and  not 
war.  The  aims  of  this  empire,  whether  in  the  Near,  Mid- 
dle, or  Far  East,  are  nowadays  mainly  cultural.  They  are 
commercial  and  political  only  in  so  far  as  the  geographical 
situation  of  Russia  makes  it  incumbent  on  her  statesmen  to 
maintain  her  territorial  integrity,  and  to  provide  for  the 
normal  expansion  of  her  industrial  and  agricultural  output. 

From    1908   onwards,    Russian   statesmen   concentrated 
their  attention  and  energies  on  everything  relating  to  the 


26  RUSSIAN  POLICY  AFTER  THE  JAPANESE  WAR 

Slavonic  affairs,  and  gave  their  diplomatic  support  to  all  the 
Balkan  Slavs.  They  encouraged  the  Panslavonic  societies  in 
Moskva  and  Petrograd  to  help  the  Western  and  Southern 
Slavs  when  these  needed  such  help.  The  formation  of  the 
Balkan  League  of  1912  was  their  deed.  And,  as  it  is  known, 
the  Balkan  League  was  not  created  for  conquests  of  new 
territories,  for   subjection   of  other   peoples,   for   national 
or  international   brigandage  and  booty.  The  Balkan  Slavs 
made  this  union,  with  the  assistance  of  their  sister  country, 
Russia,  for  the  defense  of  their  own  soil,  for  liberation  of 
their  kinsmen,  the  subjugated  ray  as,  who  were  under  the 
brutal  Asiatic  oppressor  —  the  red  Sultan!  For  six  hundred 
years  Turkish  janissaries  plundered,  persecuted,  and  mas- 
sacred the  Christian  population  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula. 
No  European  state  had  raised  its  voice  against  these  Mu- 
sulman  carnivals  of  crime.    The  only  state  sympathising 
with  the  sufferers  was  the  Empire  of  the  Tsars.  Russ  shed 
his  blood  on  more  than  one  occasion  for  the  rescue  of    his 
underling  brother  from  a  galling  yoke.  And,  as  already  noted 
in  the  first  chapter,  he  secured   nothing  for  himself,   but 
only   fought   to   assuage  the  downtrodden  and  humiliated 
peoples;  he  fought  for  justice  and  humanity. 


In  the  Far  Orient  Russia  had  many  diplomatic  adven- 
tures; most  of  them  were  successful,  but  a  few  very  dis- 
astrous. The  debdcle  occasioned  by  the  Japanese  War 
marked  a  decisive  moment  in  her  contemporary  history. 
As  a  prominent  Slavic  economist,  M.  A.  Finn-Yenotaevski, 
remarked  in  his  work,  Sovremennoe  Khoziaystvo  Rossiyi 
(The  Modern  Economy  of  Russia),  for  the  last  eight  or  ten 
years  "the  eyes  of  the  Muscovite  eagle  were  turned  from 
the  East  towards  the  West,  and  above  all  from  the  Far 
East  to  the  Near  East."  Austria's  systematic  provocations 
in  the  Balkans,  and  her  insolent  attacks  on  Serbia  and 
Croatia,  together  with  German  commercial  competition  in 
the  Levant,  forced  Russia  to  recoil  from  the  Far  Orient,  in 


RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST  27 

order  to  prevent  further  encroachments  of  the  Teutons,  and 
their  "  Pressing  towards  the  East."  If  35,000,000  of  the 
Western  Slavs  (the  Poles,  Czechs,  Slovaks),  and  15,000,000 
of  Southern  Slavs  (the  Serbians,  Croatians,  and  Slovenes) 
enslaved  at  present  time,  would  be  delivered  after  this 
bloody  European  Armageddon  they  should  be  grateful  not 
merely  to  the  Matushka-Rossiya,  but  even  to  their  foes. 
Their  eternal  enemies  hastened  the  solution  of  the  old 
Eastern  Question.  By  the  declaration  of  war  to  Serbia  and 
Russia  in  1914,  Austria-Hungary,  Germany,  and  Turkey, 
unconsciously  made  an  ample  contribution  to  the  liberation 
of  the  Slavonic  Laocoon  who  has  wrestled  for  centuries 
with  the  Hun  and  Teuton  serpents. 


APPENDIX. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 
(Utilized  documents  and  works). 

The  literature  of  Russian  history  and  politics  is  practi- 
cally inexhaustible.  The  following  bibliography  is  limited 
to  those  documents  and  works  which  have  direct  bearing 
on  the  subject  as  outlined  in  this  essay,  thereby  avoiding 
the  confusion  that  results  when  there  is  an  overhelming 
mass  of  material  to  be  examined.  For  the  spirit  of  the  Rus- 
sian politics  the  student  must  consult  all  kinds  of  politi- 
cal literature,  the  blue,  white,  green,  red,  yellow,  and 
orange  books;  the  Russian  year  books;  diplomatic  cores- 
pondence;  pamphlets;  magazine  articles,  and  even  the 
newspapers.  These  are,  of  course,  too  numerous  and  too 
fluctuating  in  character  to  be  catalogued.  Herewith  we  list 
only  the  most  important  sources  and  treatises. 

CHAPTER    I 
A)   Official  Documents. 

Traite  d*  armistice  entre  la  Russie  et  la  Porte  Ottomane,  signe 
£  Slobosia,  le  24  aotit,  1807.  ("Recueil  de  Principaux 
Traites,"  par  Geo.  Fred,  de  Martens,  pp.  689—692, 
t.  VIII.  Gottingue,  1835). 

Convention  d 'armistice  entre  la  Turquie  et  la  Serbie,  signe  a 
Brakni,  le  17  ao&t  1808.  (Idem,  "Nouveau  Recueil  de 
Traites,"  p.  88,  t.  I.  Gottingue,  1817). 

Traite  de  Paix  entre  la  Russie  et  la  Porte  Ottomane,  signe  £ 
Bucharest,  le  28  mai  1812.  (Ibidem,  pp.  397—405, 
t.  III.  Gottingue,  1818). 


30  APPENDIX 

Treaty  for  the  Settlement  of  Greece,  between  Great  Britain, 
France,  and  Russia,  with  an  additional  and  secret 
Article.  July  6,  1827.  French  and  English  text.  (Ibidem, 
pp.  282-290,  t.  VI.  Gottingue,  1829). 

Traite  de  Paix  entre  la  Russie  et  la  Porte  Ottomane. 
signe  a  Adrianople,  le  14  septembre  1829.  ( Ibidem, 
pp.  143-155,  tome  VIII.  Gottingue,  1831). 

Traitt  <f  Unkiar-Iskelessi  entre  la  Russie  et  la  Porte  Otto- 
mane.  Constantinople,  le  8  juillet  1833.  (Ibid.  pp.  655-661, 
tome  XI.  Gottingue,  1837). 

Traite  General  de  Paix,  entre  1'Autriche,  la  France,  la 
Grande-Bretagne,  la  Prusse,  la  Russie,  la  Sardaigne, 
et  la  Porte  Ottomane.  Paris,  le  30  mars  1856.  (Ibidem, 
"Nouveau  Recueil  General  de  Trates,"  tome  XV, 
pp.  770-781.  Gottingue,  1857). 

Traite  conclu  dLondres,  le  13  mars  1871,  entre  FAllemagne, 
PAutriche,  la  France,  la  Grande-Bretagne,  1'Italie,  la 
Russie,  et  la  Turquie,  pour  la  revision  des  stipulations 
du  Traite  conclu  a  Paris  le  30  mars  1856,  relatives  a  la 
navigation  de  la  Mer  Noire  et  du  Danube.  (Ibidem, 
tome  VIII,  pp.  303-306). 

Preliminaries  de  Paix  entre  la  Russie  et  la  Porte  Ottomane. 
San  Stefano,  le  3  mars  1878.  (Ibidem,  pp.  246-56.  2e  serie, 
t.  III.  Gottingue,  1878). 

Traitt   de  Berlin,    entre   1'Allemagne,    Autriche-Hongrie, 
France,  Grande-Bretagne,  Italic,  Russie,  et  Turquie, 
signe  le  13  juillet  1878.  (Ibidem,  pp.  449-465). 

Protocoles  du  Congres,  reuni  a  Berlin  du  13  juin  au  13  juillet 
1878.  (Ibidem,  pp.  276-448). 

Protocol  between  Austria- Hungary  and  Turkey  concerning 
Bosnia- Herzegovina,  signed  February  26,  1909.  (See 
"  Supplement  to  the  American  Journal  of  International 
Law,"  pp.  286-289,  vol.  3,  1909). 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  31 

Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Alliance  between  the  Kingdom 
of  Bulgaria  and  the  Kingdom  of  Serbia,  signed  at  Sofia, 
February  29,  1912.  (Ibidem,  pp.  1-11,  vol.  8,  1914). 

Treaty  of  Alliance  and  Defense  between  Bulgaria  and  Greece, 
signed  at  Sofia,  May  16,  1912.  (Ibidem,  pp.  81-85). 

Treaty  of  Peace  between  Turkey  and  the  Balkan  Allies,  signed 
at  London,  May  30,  1913.  (Ibidem,  pp.  12-13). 

Treaty  of  Peace  between  Bulgaria  and  Rumania,  Greece, 
Montenegro,  and  Serbia,  signed  at  Bucharest,  Jul.28, 1913 
(Ibidem,  pp.  13-27). 

B)  Principal  Works. 

Bernhardi,  F.  Th.  Geschichte  Russlands  und  der  Euro- 
paeischen  Politik  in  den  Jahren  1814-1831,  v.  I-III. 
Leipzig,  1863-1877. 

Brandes,  G.  Impressions  of  Russia.  London,  1890. 

Cheradame,  And.  Douze  Ans  de  Propagande  en  Faveur  des 

Peuples  Balkaniques.    Paris,    1913. 
Dolgorukov,  P.  V.  La  Verite  sur  la  Russie.  Paris,  1860. 
Dzhanshiev,  Gr.  Epoha  Velikih  Reform.  Moskva,  1900. 
Gershenzon,  M.  O.  Epoha  Nikolaya  I.  Moskva,  1910. 
Golovachev,  A.  A.  Desiat  Liet  Reform,  1861-71.  Pet.  1872. 
Gourdon,  E.  Histoire  du  Congres  de  Paris.  Paris,  1857. 
Hamley,  E.  The  War  in  the  Crimea.  London,  1891. 
Howard-Flanders,    W.   Balkania,    a   short    History   of  the 

Balkan  States.  London,  1909. 
Immanuel,   F.    La  Guerre  des  Balkans  de  1912,  v.  I-III. 

Paris,   1913. 
Istoriya  Rossiyi  v  XIX  Viekie,  t.  I-IX.  Izd.  T-va  Br.  A.  I. 

Granat  i  Komp.  Moskva,  1907-1910. 
Kovalevskiy,    Maksim   M.  La   Regime  Economique  de   la 

Russie.  Paris,  1898. 

—La  Russie  d  la  Fin  du  XIXe  Siecle.  Paris,  1900. 
Krasinski,  V.  Panslavism  and  Germanism.  London,  1848. 
Lacroix,  Paul.  Histoire  de  la  Vie  et  du  Regne  de  Nicolas  /, 

Empereur  de  Russie,  2e  ed.  Paris,  1869. 
Latimer,  El.  W.   Russia  and  Turkey  in  the  XIX  Century, 

6  ed.  Chicago,  1903. 


32  APPENDIX 

Leger,  L.  Russes  et  Slaves.  Paris,  1896. 
Lowe,  Charles.  Alexander  III  of  Russia.  London,  1895. 
Mallat,  Jos.  La  Serbie  Contemporaine,  v.  I-II.  Paris,  1902. 
Marx,  Karl.  The  Eastern  Question.  London,  1897. 
Miller,  William.  The  Balkans.  London,  1911. 
Mijatovics,  E.  L.  The  History  of  Modern  Serbia.  Lon.  1872. 
Morfill,  W.  R.  A  History  of  Russia.  London,  1902. 
Novikoff,  Olga  (O.  K.)  Skobeleff  and  the  Slavonic  Cause. 
London,    1883. 

Pokrovskiy,  M.  N.  Ruskaya  Istoriya  s  Drevnieyshih  Vremen, 
2d  ed.  v.  I-V.  Moskva,  1915. 

Rain,  Pierre.   Un  Tsar  Ideologue,  Alexandre  I.  Paris,  1913. 

Rambaud,  Alfred.  Histoire  de  Russie.  English  translation 
by  L.  B.  Lang.  Boston,  1886. 

Ranke,  Leopold.    A   History  of  Serbia.  London,  1847. 

Russell,  Sir  William  H.  The  British  Expedition  to  the  Crimea. 
London,  1877. 

Samson-Himmelstjerna,  Herman.  Russia  under  Alexan- 
der III.  Translated  from  the  German.  New  York,  1893. 

Sentupery,  Leon.  L'Europe  Politique,  t.  III.  Paris,  1895. 

Skrine,  Francis  Henry.  The  Expansion  of  Russia  ,  1815-1900. 

Cambridge,    1903. 

Stanoyevich,  St.  Istoriya  Srpskoga  Naroda.  Beograd,  1910. 
Stevenson,  F.  S.  A.  History  of  Montenegro.  London,  1913. 
Taburno,  I.  P.  Vopros  o  Raspredieleniy  Zavoyevanoy  v 

Turtsiy  Teritoriy  mezhdu  Bolgariey  i  Serbiey.  Pet.  1913. 
Tatishchev,  S.  S.  Vnieshniaya  Politika  Imperatora  Nikola- 

ya  I.  Peterburg,  1887. 

Iz  Proshlago  Ruskoy  Diplomatiyi.  Peterburg.  1890. 

Imperator  Aleksandr  II.  Peterburg,   1912. 

Thompson,  H.  N.  Russian  Politics.  London,  1895. 
Tikhomirov,  L.  A.  Russia,  Political  and  Social.  Lond.  1892. 

Urquhart,  David.  Progress  of  Russia  in  the  West,    North, 

and  South,  4  ed.  London,  1853. 

—  Recent  Events  in  the  East.  London,  1854. 
Vandel,  A.  Napoleon  et  Alexandre  I,  6e  ed.  Paris,  1900-1907. 
Yakschitch,    Gregoire.    L'Europe   et   la    Resurrection  de   la 

Serbie.  Paris,  1907. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  33 

CHAPTER    II. 
A)  Official  Documents. 

Treaty  of  Gulistan,  signed  between  Russia  and  Persia, 
October  12,  1813.  (Appendix  in  Krausse's  "  Russia  in 
Asia."  pp.  332-5.  London,  1899). 

Treaty  of  Turkomanchai,  signed  between  Russia  and  Per- 
sia, February  21,  1828.  (Ibidem,  pp.  336-41). 

Correspondence  settling  the  Russo- Afghan  Frontier  of  1872. 
(Ibidem,  pp.  344-6). 

Treaty   of    Khiva,    signed   between   Russia   and    Khiva, 
August  24,  1873.  (Ibidem,  pp.  347-50). 

Treaty  of  Bokhara,  signed  between  Russia  and  Bokhara, 
September  28,  1873.  (Ibidem,  pp.  351-3). 

Akhal-  Khorassan  Boundary  Convention,  signed  between 
Russia  and  Persia,  Dec.  21,  1881.  (Ibid.  pp.  360-2). 

Russo-Afghan  Boundary  Convention,  agreed  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, July  10,  1887.  (Ibidem,  pp.  363-72). 

Convention  between  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  with  regard  to 
the  sphere  of  influence  of  the  two  countries  in  the  re- 
gion of  the  Pamirs.  March  11,  1895.  (Ibid.  pp.  373-4). 

Convention  between  Great  Britain  and  Russia,  containing 
arrangements  on  the  subject  of  Persia,  Afghanistan,  and 
Tibet,  signed  on  August  31,  1907.  ( "  Supplement  to  the 
American  Journal  of  International  Law/'  pp.  398-406, 
vol.  I,  1907). 

Agreement  between  Germany  and  Russia,  relating  to  Persia, 
St.  Petersburg,  Aug.  19, 1911.  (Ib.  p.  120,  v.  6, 1912). 

B)  Principal  Works. 
Albrecht,  Max.  Russisch  Central  Asien.    Hamburg,  1896. 

Baddeley,  John.   The   Russian  Conquest  of  the  Caucasus. 

London,  1908. 

Baxter,  W.  E.  England  and  Russia  in  Assia.  London,  1885. 
Bouillane  de  Lacoste,  E.  Around  Afghanistan,  Lond.  1909. 

Browne,    E.    G.    The    Persian    Revolution   of   1905-1909. 

Cambridge,  1910. 
Colquhoun,  A.  R.  Russia  against  India.  London,  1900. 


34  APPENDIX 

Curzon,  G.  N.  Russia  in  Central  Assia,  in  1889,  and  the 
Anglo-Russian  Question,  2d  ed.  London,  1889. 

Persia  and  the  Persian  Question.  London,  1892.). 

Hamilton,  Angus.  Afghanistan.  London,  1906. 
Heyfelder,  O.  Transkaspien  und  seine  Eisenbahn.  Leip.  1889. 
Kostenko,  Lev.  Turkenstanskiy  Kray.  Peterburg,  1880. 
Krahmer,  (Gustav).  Russlandin  Mittel-Asien.  Leipzig,  1898. 

Die  Beziehungen  Russlands  zu  Persien.  Leipz.  1903. 

Krausse,  Alexis.  Russia  in  Asia.  London,  1899. 

Marvin,  Charles  Th.  The  Russians  at  the  Gates  of  Herat. 
New  York,  1885. 

Maslov,  A.  Zavoevanie  Akhal-Teke.  Peterburg,  1882. 

Olufsen,  O.  The  Emir  of  Bokhara  and  his  Country.  Copen- 
hagen,   1911. 

Popowski,  J.  The  Rival  Powers  in  Central  Asia.  Lond.  1897 
Reclus,  El.  Geographie   Universelle,  t.  V.  Paris,  1880. 

Rossbach,  Paul.   Die  Russische  Weltmacht  in  Mittel-  und 

Westasien.  Leipzig,  1904. 
Shuster,  W.  M.  The  Strangling  of  Persia.  New  York,  1912. 

Ukhtomskiy,    E.    E.    Puteshestvie   na   Vostok    Nasliednika 

Tsesarevicha.  Peterburg,  1893. 
Vambery,  Armin.  History  of  Bokhara.  London,  1873. 

Western  Culture  in  Eastern  Lands.  London,  1906. 

Whigham,  H.  J.  The  Persian  Problem.  New  York,  1903. 


CHAPTER   III 

A)  Official  Documents. 

Traite  de  Commerce  entre  la  Russie  et  la  Chine,  signe  & 
Kouldja,  le  25  juillet  1851.  ("Nouveau  Recueil  Gene- 
ral de  Traites,"  par  G.  F.  de  Martens,  pp.  176-180, 
tome  XVII,  partie  2.  Gottingue,  1869). 

Traite  de  Limites  entre  la  Russie  et  la  Chine,  signe  &  Aighoun, 
le  16  mai  1858.  (Ibidem,  pp.  1-2.  t.  XVII,  partie  1. 
Gottingue,  1861). 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  35 

Treaty  of  Peking,  between  Russia  and  China,  signed  No- 
vember 14,  1860.  (Appendix  in  A.  Krausse's  "  Russia 
in  Asia,"  pp.  342-43). 

Treaty  of  Hi,  between  Russia  and  China,  signed  Feb- 
ruary 12,  1881.  (Ibidem,  pp.  354-59). 

Manchurian  Railway  Agreement,  concluded  between  the 
Chinese  Government  and  the  Russo-Chinese  Bank, 
August  27,  1896.  (Ibidem,  pp.  375-83). 

Russo-Chinese  Convention,  respecting  Port  Arthur  and 
Talienwan,  March  27,  1898.  (Ibidem,  pp.  384-86). 

Anglo- Russian  Agreement,  respecting  sphere  of  influence 
in  China,  April  28,  1899.  (Ibidem,  pp.  387-8). 

B)  Principal  Works. 

Anspach,  Alfred,  La  Russie  Economique  et  I'Oeuvre  de  M. 

de  Witte.  Paris,  1904. 

Aulagnon,  Claudius.  La  Siberie  Economique.  Paris,  1901 
Bates,  Lindon  W.  The  Russian  Road  to  China.  Boston,  1910. 
Beveridge,  A.  J.  The  Russian  Advance.  New  York,  1903. 
Chirol,  V.  Far  Eastern  Question.  London,  1896. 
Cotes,  E.  Signs  and  Portents  in  the  Far  East.  London,  1907. 
Curzon,  G.  N.  Problems  of  the  Far  East.  Westminster,  1896. 
Douglas,  R.  K.  Europe  and  the  Far  East.  Cambridge,  1904. 
Dyer,  Henry.  Japan  in  World  Politics.  London,  1909. 
Golder,  F.  A.  Russian  Expansion  on  the  Pacific,  1641-1850. 

Cleveland,    1914. 

Hannah,  Ian  C.  Eastern  Assia,  a  History.  New  York,  1911. 
Harrison,  E.  J.   Peace  or  War,  East  of  Baikal*?  Yokoh.  1910. 
Hart,  A.  B.  The  Obvious  Orient.  New  York,  1911. 
Hishida,  Seiji  G.  The  International  Position  of  Japan  as  a 

Great  Power.  New  York,  1905. 

Krahmer,  (Gustav).  Russland  in  Ost-Asien.  Leipzig.,  1904. 
— Sibirien  und  dieGrosse SibirischeEisenbahn.  Lpz.  1900 
—Das  Nordoestliche  Kuestengebiet.  Leipzig,  1902. 
— Die  Beziehungen  Russlands  zu  Japan.  Leipzig,  1904. 
Krausse,  Alexis.  The  Far  East.  New  York,  1900. 
Lawton,  Lancelot.  Empires  oftheFarEast,  v.  I-II.  Bost.1912. 
Leroy-Beaulieu,  P.  The  Awakening  of  the  East.  N.  Y,  1900. 
Litman,  S.  La  Siberie  et  le  Trans-Siberien.  Paris,  1903. 


36  APPENDIX 

Little,  Archibald  J.  The  Far  East.  Oxford,  1905. 

Lowell,  Percival.  The  Soul  of  the  Far  East.  New  York,  1911. 

Millard,  T.  F.  The  New  Far  East.  New  York,  1906. 

Norman,  H.  The  Peoples  and  Politics  oftheFarEast.LonlQQQ 

Price,  M.  P.  Siberia.  London,  1912, 

Ravenstein,  E.  G.  The  Russians  on  the  Amur.  London,  1861. 

Rawlinson,  H.  England  and  Russia  in  the  East.  London,  1875. 

Reinsch,  Paul  S.  World  Politics.  New  York,  1904. 

Vasilliev,  V.  P.  Otkritie  Kitaya.  Peterburg,  1900. 

Vladimir    (  John  Foreman  ?).    Russia  on  the  Pacific,  and 
Siberian  Railway.  London,  1899. 

Weale,  Putnam  B.  L.  (B.  Simpson).  Manchu  and  Musco- 
vite. London,  1904. 
— The  Re-shaping  oftheFarEast,  v.  I-II.  London.  1905. 

Wright,  G.  F.  Asiatic  Russia.  New  York,  1902. 

CHAPTER    IV 
A)  Official  Documents. 

Treaty  of  Peace  between  Japan  and  Russia,  signed  at  Ports- 
mouth, September  5,  1905.  ("  Supplement  to  the  Ame- 
rican Journal  of  International  Law,"  pp.  17-22,  v.  1 1907). 

Agreement  between  Russia  and  China  regarding  Manchuria. 
Peking,  March  26,  1906.  (Ibid.  pp.  704-6,  v.  4,  1910). 

Russo-Japanese  Convention,  concerning  "open  door"  in 
China.  July  30,  1907.  (Ibidem,  pp.  396-7,  v.  I,  1907). 

Sino-Japanese  Peking  Treaty,  signed  December  22,  1905. 
(Ibidem,  pp.  396-97,  v.  I,  1907). 

Agreement  between  Russia  and  Mongolia,  with  accompanying 
Protocol,  signed  at  Urga,  Novem.  3,  1912.  (Ib.  pp.  180-7) 

Analysis  of  the  China-Japanese  Treaties.  Their  Bearing  on 
American  Interests.  By  Geo.  Bronson  Rea.  Publisher 
of  "The  Far  Eastern  Review."  (Shanghai,  1915). 

China's  Official  History  of  the  Recent  Sino-Japanese  Trea- 
ties. (Idem  ?  ). 

Sbornik  Diplomaticheskih  Dokumentov,  Kasayushchihsia 
Sobitiy  na  Balkanskom  Poluostrovie  1912-1913.  Izdanie 
Ministerstva  Inostrannih  Diel.  Peterburg,  1914. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  37 

B)  Principal  Works. 

Albert,  Louis.  Paix  Japonaise.  Paris,  1906. 

Alexinsky,    Gregor.    Modern    Russia.    Transleted  from  the 

Russian,  by  Bernard  Miall.    London,  1913. 
Russia   and   the  Great    War.    Translated   from   the 

Russian,  by  Bernard  Miall.  New  York,  1915. 
Blakeslee,  George  H.  China  and  the  Far  East.  N.  York,  1910. 
Drage,  Geoffrey.  Russian  Affairs.  London,  1904. 
Finn-Yenotaevskiy,  M.  A.  Sovremennoe  Khoziaystvo  Rossiyi 

Peterburg,    1914. 

Goodrich,  J.  K.  Russia  in  Europe  and  Asia.  Chicago,  1912. 
Kallash,  V.  Rossiya  otSmuti  do  Nashego  Vremeni.  Mos.  1913 
Kovalevskiy,  M.M.  Istoriya  Nashego  Vremeni.  Sovremen- 

niya  Kultura  i  eya  Problema.  Peterburg,  1914. 
Martov,  L.  Obshchestvennoe  Dvizhenie  v  Rossiyi  v   Nachalie 

XX    Vieka.  Peterburg,  1914. 

Martin,  Rudolf  Emil.  The  Future  of  Russia.  Translated  from 
the  German.  London,  1906. 

Mavor,  James.  An  Economic  History  of  Russia.  N.  Y.  1914. 
Miazgovskiy,  E.  A.  IstoriyaChernomorskagoFlota  1696-1912. 

Peterburg,    1914. 
Miliukov,  Pavel  N.  Russia  and  its  Crisis.  Chicago,  1905. 

Glavniya  Techeniya  Russkoy  Istoricheskoy  Misli.  Ya- 

roslav,   1913. 

—  Ocherki  po  Istoriyi  Russkoy  Kulturi.    Peterb.  1913. 
Ovsianik  Kulakovskiy,  D.  N.   Istoriya  Ruskoy  Intelligen- 

tsiyi.  Peterburg,  1914. 
Ovsianiy,  N.  R.  Blizhniy  Vostok  i  Slavianstvo.  Pet.  1913. 

Perry- Ascough,  H.  G.  C.  With  the  Russians  in  Mongo- 
lia.   London,    1913. 

Pipin,    A.  N.     Panslavism  v  Proshlom  i    Nastoyashchem. 
Peterburg,  1913. 


3S  APPENDIX 

Plekhanov,  G.  V.  Istoriya  Ruskoy  Obshchestvenoy  Misli. 
Peterburg.  1914. 

Seton- Watson,  R.  W.  The  Southern  Slav  Question  and  the 
Habsburg  Monarchy.  London,  1911. 

Tucic,  Srgjan  PL    The  Slav  Nations.  London,  1915. 

Weale,  Putnam  B.  L.  The  Truce  in  the  East  and  its  After- 
math. New  York,  1907. 

The  Coming  Struggle  in  Eastern  Asia.  London,  1908. 

Wallace,  D.  Mackenzie.  Russia.  Revised  and  enlarged 
edition.  London,  1912. 


Gaylord  Bros. 

Makers 

Syracuse,  N.  Y. 
PAT.  JAN.  21 ,1908 


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